We cannot fail to be struck today by the reference to the term and notion of “value(s)”. Evaluating is both asserting oneself and expressing oneself, but also standing out on a social and political map, in other words exposing oneself to the double meaning of the term as Bernard Harcourt suggests with regard to social networks. Evaluating would be the new avatar of power technologies in the digital age. Wouldn’t any resistance, as long as it is based on the claim and the promotion of (another) axiology, be part of the game it intends to denounce? Isn’t it the very possibility of resistance that seems out of the question? Unless, perhaps, we disconnect judgment from preference. Unless, perhaps, we acknowledge values independently of the subjective assessment that individuals make of them. This is what the Stoics set out to do in their day, and it is this Stoic thinking regarding evaluation—reformulated here in terms of “evaluation device”—that this book is concerned with. It is a question of knowing which concepts and specific practices the Hellenistic and then imperial Stoics refer to when speaking of value and judgment and how these two aspects link together, which involves addressing rich themes like axiology and psychology, the theory of action and the doctrine of passions. In addition to the value of such an analysis given the lack of work specifically devoted to the question of value within Stoic studies, this investigation also intends to have a philosophical scope likely to contribute to the critique of our ways of thinking and acting.