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dc.contributor.authorSchulz, Daniel F.
dc.contributor.authorVerdun, Amy
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-19T04:03:42Z
dc.date.available2022-05-19T04:03:42Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.date.submitted2022-05-18T08:43:12Z
dc.identifierhttps://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/54471
dc.identifier.urihttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/81749
dc.description.abstractAs the guardian of the euro, the European Central Bank (ECB) oversees a prime example of differentiated integration. Against the backdrop of the multiple crises of the euro’s second decade, this contribution asks how the ECB has dealt with differentiation. It analyses both the historical development of the ECB’s relationship with euro outsiders – discerning between ‘old’ opt-outs and ‘new’ accession countries in the context of EU enlargement – and how differentiation affects ECB policymaking across its various tasks. Specifically, we analyze three logics of ‘deepening’ and ‘widening’: (1) Is the ECB encouraging euro membership among the ‘outs’? (2) Does it seek to reduce the impact of differentiation by keeping the ‘outs’ on board as much as possible? (3) Or does the ECB further cement differentiation by excluding the ‘outs’ from decision-making or deepening integration among the ‘ins’ only? We find that, in the past, the ECB has been hesitant to support ‘more Europe’. When the sovereign debt crisis posed a potentially existential threat, however, the ECB started adopting a more proactive role through both monetary policies and discursive acts. The COVID-19 crisis appears to confirm that the ECB has shed its narrow technocratic focus in order to provide political leadership in the EU. Yet, in our view, this does not suggest that the ECB is a competence maximizer ‘hardwired’ to ever closer union. Rather, the evidence suggests that it merely accepted greater powers and a deepening of integration to avert the threat of (differentiated) disintegration.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.rightsopen access
dc.subject.classificationbic Book Industry Communication::J Society & social sciences::JP Politics & government
dc.subject.otherEuropean Central Bank; euro; ECB; differentiation; EU enlargement; euro membership; disintegration
dc.titleChapter 13 Differentiation and the European Central Bank
dc.title.alternativeA bulwark against (differentiated) disintegration?
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.4324/9780429054136-15
oapen.relation.isPublishedByfa69b019-f4ee-4979-8d42-c6b6c476b5f0
oapen.relation.isPartOfBookThe Routledge Handbook of Differentiation in the European Union
oapen.relation.isPartOfBook3107178c-255d-463f-8a82-eac921bf4e7d
oapen.relation.isFundedByab06dcee-1414-4f21-b117-49431e680179
oapen.relation.isFundedByd576e9db-93d4-49fc-8e5a-88e92c7175ae
oapen.relation.isbn9780367149659
oapen.relation.isbn9781032183824
oapen.imprintRoutledge
oapen.pages17
dc.relationisFundedByab06dcee-1414-4f21-b117-49431e680179


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