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dc.contributor.authorGilbert, Richard J.
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-21T15:12:40Z
dc.date.available2022-02-21T15:12:40Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifierONIX_20220221_9780262358637_107
dc.identifier.urihttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/78587
dc.description.abstractA proposal for moving from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy, reviewing theory and evidence on economic incentives for innovation. Competition policy and antitrust enforcement have traditionally focused on prices rather than innovation. Economic theory shows the ways that price competition benefits consumers; and courts, antitrust agencies, and economists have developed tools for the quantitative evaluation of price impacts. Antitrust law does not preclude interventions to encourage innovation, but over time the interpretation of the laws has raised obstacles to enforcement policies for innovation. In this book, economist Richard Gilbert proposes a shift from price-centric to innovation-centric competition policy. Antitrust enforcement should be concerned with protecting incentives for innovation and preserving opportunities for dynamic, rather than static, competition. In a high-technology economy, Gilbert argues, innovation matters. Gilbert considers both theory and available empirical evidence on the relationships among market structure, firm behavior, and the production of new products and services. He reviews the distinctive features of the high-tech economy and why current analytical tools used by antitrust enforcers aren't up to the task of assessing innovation concerns. He considers, from the perspective of innovation competition, Kenneth Arrow's “replacement effect” and the Schumpeterian theory of market power and appropriation; discusses the effect of mergers on innovation and future price competition; and reviews the empirical literature on competition, mergers, and innovation. He describes examples of merger enforcement by US and European antitrust agencies; examines cases brought against Microsoft and Google; and discusses the risks and benefits of interoperability standards. Finally, he offers recommendations for competition policy.
dc.languageEnglish
dc.relation.ispartofseriesThe MIT Press
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::K Economics, Finance, Business and Management::KC Economics::KCD Economics of industrial organizationen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::L Law::LN Laws of specific jurisdictions and specific areas of law::LNC Company, commercial and competition law: general::LNCH Competition law / Antitrust lawen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::P Mathematics and Science::PD Science: general issues::PDR Impact of science and technology on societyen_US
dc.subject.othercompetition
dc.subject.otherinnovation
dc.subject.otherantitrust
dc.subject.othermergers
dc.subject.otheracquisitions
dc.subject.otherresearch and development
dc.subject.otherR&D
dc.subject.othermonopoly
dc.subject.otherantitrust policy
dc.subject.otherGoogle
dc.subject.otherMicrosoft
dc.subject.otherEuropean Commission
dc.subject.otherJustice Department
dc.subject.otherFTC
dc.subject.otherArrow
dc.subject.otherSchumpeter
dc.titleInnovation Matters
dc.title.alternativeCompetition Policy for the High-Technology Economy
dc.typebook
oapen.identifier.doi10.7551/mitpress/12686.001.0001
oapen.relation.isPublishedByae0cf962-f685-4933-93d1-916defa5123d
oapen.relation.isbn9780262358637
oapen.relation.isbn9780262044042
oapen.imprintThe MIT Press
oapen.pages336
oapen.place.publicationCambridge


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