The Political Economy of Sovereign Default

dc.contributor.author	Sebastian Hohmann	*
dc.date.accessioned	2021-02-11T23:20:43Z
dc.date.available	2021-02-11T23:20:43Z
dc.date.issued	2012	*
dc.date.submitted	2017-10-09 11:02:38	*
dc.identifier	23820	*
dc.identifier.uri	https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/56541
dc.description.abstract	What do self-interested governments’ needs to maintain loyal groups of supporters imply for sovereign incentives to repay debt? Many sovereign defaults have occurred at relatively low levels of debt, while some highly indebted nations continue to honour their obligations. This poses a problem for traditional models of sovereign debt, which rely on the threat of economic sanctions to explain why and when a representative agent seeking to maximise social welfare would choose debt-repayment. The...	*
dc.language	English	*
dc.subject.other	risks	*
dc.subject.other	State \| Nation	*
dc.subject.other	financial globalisation	*
dc.subject.other	non-state actors and civil society	*
dc.subject.other	debt	*
dc.subject.other	finance	*
dc.subject.other	governance	*
dc.title	The Political Economy of Sovereign Default	*
dc.type	book
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy	72b0526f-f1c9-41b3-a451-219e0317e896	*
oapen.relation.isbn	9782940503070	*
oapen.relation.isbn	9782940503087	*

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