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dc.contributor.authorHeier, Tormod
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-10T12:58:18Z
dc.date.issued2018
dc.date.submitted2018-10-08 13:13:20
dc.date.submitted2020-04-01T12:20:20Z
dc.identifier1001657
dc.identifierOCN: 1076751277
dc.identifierhttp://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/28305
dc.identifier.urihttps://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/29161
dc.description.abstract"The chapter describes and discusses interaction within the Norwegian Armed Forces. Military interaction is understood as the dynamic and sometimes unpredictable action undertaken when two or more services interact. The chapter explores why interaction between military services, such as land, sea and air forces, is difficult – and, in some circumstances, completely absent. How can inadequate interaction between the military branches be explained? As Europe’s armed forces become increasingly complex and sophisticated, two perspectives from organisational theory are applied. First, an instrumental perspective is used to comprehend the problem. Particular attention is paid to the tension between hierarchical authority and the division of labour. Thereafter, a cultural perspective is used to comprehend inter-service rivalry. Here, attention is paid to informal rules and regulations, or habitual ‘rules of thumb’ that have become institutionalised over time. These ‘the behavioural patterns’ affect the way military services perceive themselves in contrast to others. The main finding is that Norway’s Armed Forces suffer from ‘limited rationality’. This is because Norway’s military units operate within a fragmented command structure that consists of many different sub-organisations; individually, in times of peace in Norway, they pursue their own myopic agendas rather than a comprehensive national objective. In this process, the branches are also forced to compromise with each other to reach their individual objectives. A form of limited rationality therefore arises because the Army, Navy and Air Force act rationally. This is, however, not on the basis of what serves Norwegian security best, but on the basis of what is rational for their specific branch."
dc.languageEnglish
dc.rightsopen access
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciencesen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defenceen_US
dc.subject.classificationthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence::JWK Military and defence strategyen_US
dc.subject.otherSamhandling
dc.subject.otherinteraction
dc.subject.othersubcultures
dc.subject.othermilitary
dc.subject.otherorganisational learning
dc.subject.otherleadership
dc.subject.otherunforeseen
dc.subject.otherthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences
dc.subject.otherthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence
dc.subject.otherthema EDItEUR::J Society and Social Sciences::JW Warfare and defence::JWK Military and defence strategy
dc.titleChapter 16 Military Samhandling
dc.title.alternativeFormal and Informal Behaviour in Norway’s Armed Forces
dc.typechapter
oapen.identifier.doi10.23865/noasp.36.ch16
oapen.relation.isPublishedBy9266f8a8-a49e-4697-9bd1-69645f9037c2
oapen.relation.isPartOfBookInteraction: 'Samhandling' Under Risk
oapen.pages18
oapen.place.publicationOslo


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