Money in the Bank--Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations
RAND Counterinsurgency Study--Paper 4
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https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/OP185OSDAuthor(s)
Rabasa, Angel
Chalk, Peter
Khilko, Ivan
Shukla, Paraag
Warner, Lesley Anne
Language
EnglishAbstract
Six historic counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of U.S. involvement. Future U.S. COIN operations can learn from these past lessons.
Keywords
Political ScienceDOI
10.7249/OP185OSDISBN
9780833042835, 9780833041593Publisher
RAND CorporationPublication date and place
2007Classification
Warfare and defence
Political control and freedoms